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BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM: 
.THE REGULATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR POWER GENERATION* 
Margaret Rouse Bates** 
I. THE LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR REGULATION 
Governmental involvement has been a major feature of the atond.c 
energy industry not only from its inception� but even prior to its 
existence in any recognizable form. As a result of the peculiar condi-
tions of World War II - including, it has been argued, the presence of 
refugee scientists more attmled than their American counterparts to 
potential governmental interests - atomic energy was first developed 
for military use. It was appropriated by the defense establishment 
directly from university laboratories; and in some respects, it was 
diverted even earlier in the developmental process, before laboratory 
efforts to confirm theoretical hypotheses had actually begun. Thus, 
during the war years, development of knowledge about atomic fission 
processes in general, and construction of an atomic bomb in particular, 
were both made the exclusive responsibility of the Manhattan District, 
Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense.1 
Once the war was over, there would be increasing pressures for a 
"normalization" of atomic energy1 in the context of the presumed American 
commitment to free enterprise. But s�ch pressures would be exerted upon 
an existing scheme of development, rather than in an institutional vacuum. 
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Their effect would have to be measured in terms of incremental changes 
in the institutional pattern established during the war, rather than de 
!!£YQ.• And that pattern was not generally considered a typical one. Many 
other industries have a history of increasing governmental regulation, as 
their attendant Social benefits and costs emerge or are perceived. But 
the atomic energy industry has been a governmental protege. As a result, 
its policy issues and debates have centered less on the positive need for 
regulation, than on the extent to which the scope of governmental respon-
eibility could safely be reduced. It is my contention that this differ-
ence is primar:tly one of perspective, rather than substance. That is to 
say, the relat:f.onship between governmental regulation and industtial 
performance wit:h regard to atomic energy is amenable to essentially the 
same analytic questions and techniques as are used in evaluating other 
regulated industries. Nonetheless, the difference in perspective' does 
remain. It is therefore important to understand the development of the 
government-industry relationship over time. 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
The first break in the wartime pattern was passage of the At:omic 
Energy Act of 1946. However, the major issue in its debate was not 
whether the development of atomic energy should continue to be focused 
on military uses, although that question was a source of concern, partic-
ularly for scientists. Rather, the debate centered on the degreE� to 
which there should be civilian control of such-development. Although 
technically the Army Corps of Engineers, including its Manhattan District, 
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was subordinate to a civilian Secretary of Defense, a greater degree of 
civilian control was desired. Thus, the new Act created a five-member, 
civilian, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to exercise control over the 
sources of radioactive materials. It would both supervise the production 
and use of atomic materials, and be responsible for the further develop­
ment of atomic energy technology. Nonetheless, the orientation remained 
one of primary concentration on military uses� and secrecy also continued 
to be a major concern. As a consequence. the new Commission's powers were 
explicitly designed to be unusually broad. It was, for example, described 
by the Act's legislative drafters as "an island of socialism in the midst 
of a free enterprise economy.112 In part for that reason, the Act also 
created a corresponding Congressional committee with broad authority to 
obtain information from the Commission, in order to oversee its activities 
effectively. On the other hand, since the Joint Conunittee on Atomic 
Energy (JCAE) comprised nine members each from the Senate and the House 
of Representatives, it would be the sole source of substantive, as 
opposed to budgetary, oversight by the Congress. And many of its deliber­
ations would take place in executive session. 
However, a further mitigating factor in the Commission's potential 
for effective monopoly was provided by its own policy of contracting for 
most of its operational responsibilities, with selected universities and 
corporations. Although there were Vf:.ry narrow limits both on the number 
of entities involved, and on the degree to which they could take advantage 
of the knowledge gained from their affiliation with the AEC in their other 
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activities, there -was at least some exposure of elements in the private 
sector to the new field. 
Under this general organizational pattern, the United States developed 
its first stockpile of radioactive materials and weapons. Concow.itantly, 
it also made some strides in the development of nuclear reactors for 
power generation, primarily as an offshoot of its military programs.3 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
By the early 19SO's, a number of new developments impinging on 
atomic energy had occurred. The nuclear monopoly thought to be held 
by the United States had been broken by the Soviet Union and Britain, so 
that attempts to maintain absolute secrecy were no longer seen as. pos­
sible, or necessarily desirable. The new Republican Administrat:Lon was 
committed to reducing the scope of governmental activity and enc<)Uraging 
private enterprise. President Eisenhower personally proposed an "Atoms 
for Peace" program before the United Nations, to promote international 
cooperation in the development of peaceful uses for the new technology. 
Scientific opposition to its continued focus on military applications had 
grown. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had become restive with the 
pace of development provided by the Atomic Energy Commission. And 
industrial interest in new applications of atomic energy had inc1:-eased 
sufficiently to engender the formation of an Atomic Industrial Forum 
in 1953, to serve as a trade association. 
In keeping with such changes in circumstance, the debate ovt�r new 
legislation for atomic energy no longer centered on the indirect issue of 
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civilian control, as it had in 1946. Rather it focused directly on the 
desire for civilian applications of the new technology, and on the 
potential for an atomic energy industry in the private sphere. There 
tended to be general agreement on the desirability of fostering the 
use of atomic energy as a source of power for civilian uses, so long as 
its continued availability for military needs was not undermined. There 
was considerable division, however, on the question of whether that ap­
plication could, or should, be developed under essentially private, 
rather than public, auspices. This aspect of the debate was further 
complicated by the simultaneous eruption of the Dixon-Yates affair, 
which drew the AEC into the longstanding argument between advocates of 
public and private utilities.4 
The end of the federal monopoly, The new Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 which emerged from the legislative debate remained in force for 
twenty years, although it was amended in several respects during that 
time. Its major effect was to break the federal government's monopoly 
on the use of radioactive materials, by providing for their lease to 
private industry - or, as a result of the.Dixon-Yates controversy, to 
public utilities - for the purpose of power generation. As a consequence, 
the arena for policy debate about atomic energy was removed, at least 
potentially, from the confines of intragovernmental discussion. Moreover, 
the basic regulatory pattern for the use of atomic energy in centrr.l 
station power plants was established. The primary form of regulation 
would be the issuance of licenses, although secondary and related efforts 
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would focus on standard setting for license applications and enforcement 
of license conditions. In this respect, therefore, the AEC's regulatory 
role would be similar to that of the FCC, which issues broadcast 
licenses, and dissimilar to that of the FPC, which regulates pric•as 
and rates of return directly.5 
The separation of military and civilian programs. Another conse­
quence of the new legislation was the creation of a dichotomy between 
the military and civilian aspects of the atomic energy program. Here­
tofore, the two had been linked in an overall reactor development pro­
gram. Thus, considerable emphasis had been place upon so-called 'dual 
purpose' reactors which could be used either for weapons production or 
for power generation. And in the early 1950's, the AEC had actually 
involved a larger number of firms in its reactor programs.6 Now, however, 
the Commission would be responsible for reactor development both :for 
military purposes, and explicitly for power generation as an independent 
goal in itself. 
Responsibllity for the mllitary uses of atomic energy would remain 
the sole province of the federal government, with private firms _involved 
only as contractors. The AEC would continue to be responsiblE: for pro­
ducing the fissionable materials required by the Department of Defense 
(altho�gh it has been suggested that the relationship typically ran the 
other way, with Defense using or at least accepting, whatever the A3C 
said it could produce). Thi$ side of the agency's responsibility remained 
subject to strict security classification. As a consequence, it is not 
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readily amenable to analysis except for very linrl.ted purposes, and with 
limited data - primarily the records of the budgetary process.7 
However, for our purposes, the major point to be made about the defense 
aspects of atomic energy is that they have continued to be a major con­
cern and responsibility of the AEC. The details of such programs are on 
the whole less important than the mere fact of their existence, and 
their consequent potential for affecting the course of the civilian 
programt directly or indirectly. 
The promotional-regulatory combination. By contrast with the 
secrecy and restriction associated with the military side of atomic 
energy, the 1954 Act gave the AEC a mandate to promote more extensive 
diffusion of atomic energy in the private and public utility sectors, 
subject only to the caveats that public health and safety and the 
common defense be adequately protected. It should be stressed, however, 
that this responsibility would involve continued research and develop­
ment by the Cotnmission and its contractors, as well as regulation of 
the new industry's actions. Thus, the 1954 Act established the basis 
for what was subsequently to become a major source of controversy 
the combination of promotional and regulatory responsibilities in the 
same governmental agency. 
The licensing process� It also established the basic outlines of 
the licensing process itself.8 It is, first of all, the responsibility 
of the individual utility to take the initiative in proposing, planning, 
locating, and building a nuclear power plant. It is the function of the 
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Atomic Energy Commission to review such proposals, on a case-by-case 
basis, to insure that the safety of the public will be protected; and 
the utility must obtain concurrence from the Commission before actually 
implementing its plans. The review and licensing procedures of the 
Commission are divided into two sequential stages, First, the utility 
applies for permission to build a proposed plant. When the Commi·ssion 
is satisfied that the utility has made adequate preparations and '.has an 
acceptable plan, it issues a construction permit. Then, as the ci:>n­
struction process is nearing completion, the utility must come back to 
the Commission for a further review. At that point, if its findings 
are favorable, the Commission issues the utility an operating lic•2'nse, 
which authorizes it to use the plant for power generation. Although 
the substantive focus of the Commission's review is somewhat diff1;!rent 
at the two stages of the licensing process, the procedural requir1;!ments 
are quite similar. 
The first step in obtaining a construction permit is the utility's 
submission of a formal application. At that point, the applicant has 
already ordered the reactor components from the nuclear equipment 
vendors, and selected and acquired a reactor site. It is also hii; 
responsibility to obtain any additional permits or approvals requ:lred 
by other governmental agencies, although that process may proceed con­
currently with the AEC' s review. In submitting an application fo1:- a 
construction permit to the AEC, the utility pays a substantial applica­
tion fee, and also furnishes proof of its ability to finance the proposed 
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conStructlon. But.the central part of the application is the Preliminary 
Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), which typically runs to several volumes: 
11This represents the design criteria and preliminary design 
information for the proposed reactor and comprehensive data 
on the proposed site. The report also discusses various 
hypothetical accident situations and the safety features 
which will be provided to prevent accidents or, if they should 
occur, to mitigate their effects on both the public and the 
facilities employees.119 
Altho�gh the application materials are made available to the public 
at the time that the Commission formally dockets the case, the second 
major step in the licensing process is review of the application by the 
Commission's Regulatory Staff. That review is an extensive one, and the 
Staff may require whatever additional information it needs from the 
applicant. It may also consult with other governmental agencies in their 
areas of expertise. A description of the technical review's principal 
features was published by the AEC in 1973: 
"l. A review is made of the population density and use 
characteristics of the site environs, and the physical 
characteristics of the site , including seismology, 
meteorology ,  geology and hydrology to determine that 
these characteristics have been determined adequately 
and have been given appropriate consideration in the 
Plant design, and that the site characteristics are in 
accordance with the siting criteria (10 CFR Part 100)� 
taking into consideration the design of the facility 
including the engineered safety features provided. 
2. A review is performed of the design, fabrication, 
construction, testing and expected performance of the 
plant structures, systems and components important to 
safety to determine that they are in accord with the 
regulations, regulatory guides, and other requirements, 
and that any departures from these requirements have 
been identified and justified. 
3. Evaluations are made of the response of the facility 
to various anticipated operating transients and to a 
broad spectrum of hypothetical accidents. The potential 
4. 
5. 
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consequences of these hypothetical accidents are then 
evaluated conservatively to determine that the calculated 
potential offsite doses that might result, in the very 
unlikely event of their occurrence , could not exceed 
appropriate guidelines for site acceptability • • • •
A revtew is made of the applicant's plans for the conduct 
of plant operations including the organizational structu:re, 
the technical qualifications of operating and technical 
support personnel, the measures taken for industrial 
security, and the planning for emergency actions to be 
taken in the unlikely event of an accident that might 
affect the general public. This review is used to 
determine whether the applicant is technically qualified 
to operate the plant and whether he has established 
effective organizations and plans for continuing safe 
operation of the facility. 
Evaluations are made of the design of the systems pro­
vided for control of the radiological effluents from 
the plant to determine that these systems can control the 
release of radioactive wastes from the station within the 
limits specified by the regulations and that the applica:ri.t 
will operate the facility in such a manner as to reduce 
radioactive releases to levels that are as low as practic.able. ulO 
The Regulatory Staff's conclusions are presented in a Safety Evaluation 
Report. (SER). 
The third m.ajor step in the licensing process is review of thi� 
application by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS),. 
which comprises up to fifteen i1on-AEC scientists appointed by the 
Commission for fc)ur-year terms. Copies of each application are given 
to the ACRS at the time of their original submission; and a subcommittee 
is appointed to keep track of each particular case as it undergoes the 
Regulatory Staff� s review, and to notP. any modifications. The sub-· 
committee then prepares a report of its crwn, which is submitted along 
with the Regulatory Staff's COD�leted Safety Evaluation Report to the 
full Committee. The Advisory Committee also meets with the Regulatory 
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Staff and the applicant. It then submits a report, written as a letter 
to the Chairman of the Commission. At that point, the Regulatory Staff 
updates its review in a Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, which 
also addresses any new questions raised by the ACRS. 
Once all of these techn'ical reviews are complete, the final step 
in the licensing process for a construction permit is the public hearing. 
Its task is to determine: 
111. whether the application and the record· of the proceeding 
contain sufficient information for assessment of the 
radiological safety and environmental impact of the 
proposed facility and 
2. whether review of the application by the AEC Regulatory 
Staff has been adequate to support the findings proposed 
to be made by the Director of Regulation and to support 
issuance of a construction permit. For a contested 
hearing, the licensing board also considers the conten­
tions and testimonies of the intervening parties.1111 
The licensing board (or examiner) then issues an initial decision, 
granting or denying the construction permit. That finding stands as 
the decision of the agency, unless it is appealed to a special review 
board or the Commission itself, or they choose to review it on their 
own motion. 
The Commission's staff continues to monitor the actual construction 
of the facility once the construction permit is granted. As it nears 
completion, the utility applies for an operating license by submitting 
a Final �afety Analysis Report (FSAR). It contains "plans for operation, 
procedures for coping with emergency situations, and pertinent details 
on the final design of the reactor itself - such as containment design, 
- 12 -
design of the nuclear core, and waste handling system."12 That report 
goes through essentially the same steps as the PSAR at the construction 
permit stage; detailed review by the Regulatory Staff, and resultant 
modifications; a Safety Evaluation Report and Supplement; a rev:tew and 
report by the ACRS; and, in some instances, public hearings, When the 
operating license is issued, it includes a detailed set of Technical 
Specifications, "which set forth the particular safety and environ-
mental protection measures to be imposed upon the facility and the 
conditions of its operations that are to be met in order to assure 
protection of the health and safety of the public and of the surrounding 
environment. nl3 The Commission then maintains an ongoing inspec:tion 
program for the life of the license, to insure that the Technica.l 
Specifications are adhered to in practice. 
There have been a number of modifications in the exact procedures 
followed by the Commission over the twenty-year period, 1954 to 1974, 
most of which are indicated in the following discussion. There have 
also been some significant substantive additions to the Commission's 
areas of concern over time. And in practice, there has been extensive 
informal interaction between applicants and the Commission staff� in 
addition to the requirements of the formal review process. But ,:i.11 of 
these variations have been implemented within the basic framewor:tc 
outlined above, so that every license application considered by the 
Commission has faced essentially the same series of steps in the 
regulatory process. 
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II. POWER REACTOR DEVELOPMENT 
As noted earlier, a number of industrial firms had become involved 
in the AEC's reactor development program before the passage of the 1954 
Act, under contracting arrangements. The same industrial pressures 
which contributed to the demand for new legislation had also resulted 
.in a significant expansion in the number of such firms during the 
early 1950's. Then the licensing authority provided in the new Act 
greatly extended the potential for private involvement in atomic 
energy, at least in theory. But in practice, there proved to be 
unexpected difficulties and delays. As a result� it was 1957 before 
the outlines of the new government-industry relationship began to 
appear. However, in that year there were four major developments which 
foreshadowed many of the debates and issues conce.rning atomic energy 
to the present. 
The Shippingport Reactor 
The first nuclear power reactor of potentially commercial scale 
went critical only in 1957. It was located at Shippingport, Pennsyl­
vania, near Pittsburgh, and it was owned by the AEC. In fact, it was 
a direct outgrowth of the Commission's program to develop a nuclear 
reactor-powered submarine for the Navy. Essentially, the reactor was 
a land-based version of the one used in the Nautilus. Thus, it wa� a 
light-water reactor of the pressurized-water type, and it was built by 
Westinghouse under contract to the AEC. Here was an obvious example 
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of the military development program having a direct effect on the form 
of the civilian one. But the Shippingport case also was an exam:ple of 
the AEC' s desi.re to involve utilities directly in its developmenl� pro­
gram, in order to gear it more realistically to industry needs. As 
the result of its response to an invitation for industrial participa­
tion issued by the AEC in 1953 - before the passage of the 1954 Act -
the Duquesne Light Company of Pittsburgh built the associated elE�ctri­
cal generation facilities at Shippingport, contributed substantia.lly 
toward the coat of the reactor itself, gained title to the nonnuclear 
facilities, became responsible for the operation of the reactor once 
it was completed, and distributed its electrical output over the com­
pany' s grid.14 Part of the interest of the utilities in nuclear pos­
sibilities was apparently sparked by the desire to forestall the ,:\EC 1 s 
entry directly into such activities on its own, However, because 
Duquesne undertook its responsibilities on a contract basis, the plant 
was not subject to the licensing procedures newly established by 1:he 
1954 Act. Technically, it was authorized, rather than licensed, 1:0 
operate .. 
The Fermi Reactor 
A second industrial venture into the use of atomic energy for power 
production had been initiated in 1955 by the Power Reactor Development 
Corporation (PRDC), which comprised more than 30 corporate members, 
including Detroit Edison. The PRDC proposed to build a breeder reactor, 
to be named aftE�r the nuclear scientist, Enrico Fermi, some thirty miles 
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from Detroit. It therefore filed an application for a construction 
permit with the AEC. In 1956, as the licensing review unfolded, the 
AEC's statutory Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) filed 
an unfavorable report on the Fermi reactor. The committee particularly 
questioned its location so close to a major population center� 
11Although there are no facts or calculations available to the 
Committee that clearly indicate that the proposed reactor is 
not safe for this site, the Committee believes there is in­
sufficient information available at this time to give assurance 
that the PRDC reactor can be operated at this site without 
public hazard."15 
When the Commission Chairman, Lewis Strauss� chose not to publish 
the Committee's report, and the AEC subsequently approved the applica-
tion for a construction permit, another AEC Commissioner, Thomas 
Murray, revealed the unfavorable finding. Senator Clinton Anderson 
of New Mexico, a member of the JCAE, then contacted a number of 
Michigan leaders and organizations. As a result, three labor unions 
petitioned to intervene in the AEC proceedings. When the AEC reaffirmed 
its decision to grant a construction permit to the PR.DC, the·unions went 
to court to have the permit set aside. Their request was initially 
granted by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals; but the AEC and PRDC took 
the case to the Supreme Court, where the Appeals Court decision was 
overturned in 1961. Thus, the Fermi reactor was ultimately licensed 
for construction. But it was plagued by operational difficulties, and 
its fuel core was eventually destroyed in a criticality accident, so 
that it was never operated connnercially.16 In· the meantime, as a 
result of the controversy over the COmm.ission1s decision despite the 
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Advisory Co?lll!littee's report, the Ato!nic Energy Act was amended. ACRS 
reports were made mandatory and public (although the Committee's 
deliberations remained secret), and public hearings were made a 
mandatory part of nuclear licensing proceedings. 
The Fermi case was significant for a number of reasons, qu:lte 
apart from its direct impact as an example often cited by nuclear 
critics. First, the choice of a breeder reactor, despite its techni-
cal difficulties and unknowns, reflected a concern over the availability 
of adequate nuclear fuel supplies, which was to continue to the present. 
Second, the conflict over the location of reactors near major popula­
tion centers would also be a recurring one. It was the result of two 
competing, and perhaps even mutually exclusive, desires. In the� face 
of uncertain technology, distance from population centers repre€rented 
an additional safety factor. On the other hand, the technology and 
economics of the utility industry favored location of power generation 
facilities as near to major load centers as possible. Third, the 
Fermi case represented the first attempt by nonnuclear organizations 
to intervene :ln AEC licensing proceedings. Fourth, the outcome itself 
seems to be oue that would subsequently become a fairly typical pat-
tern: intervenors would lose the particular case, although they might 
delay the outcome; but there would be procedural changes in the li-
censing process in response to their objections. Fifth, the active 
involvement of both the courts and the members of the Joint Comm:ittee 
in the atomic-energy decisionmaking process would be a recurring factor. 
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Finally, a favorable licensing decision - in subsequent instances, as 
in the Fermi case - would not necessarily mean that successful operation 
of the reactoi+would follow easily or quickly. 
WASH-740 
A third major development in 1957 was the AECts publication of the 
so-called Brook.haven Report, designated as WASH-740, Prepared for the 
Connnission by staff members of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, the 
report sought to assess the Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences 
of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants.17 Its major finding 
was that such an incident constituted a low probability - high conse­
quence event. The major emphasis of the report was on the low probabil­
ity, �ut it was the high consequence estimates which evoked strong 
public reaction, The report suggested that the casualty and damage 
figures for the 11maximum credible accident" would not exceed 3�400 
fatalities, 43,000 injuries, and $7 billion in property damage. Even 
though the probability of such an event might be very low, the large 
casualty figures proved disturbing. The report was a factor both in 
the Fermi reactor licensing case and in the debate over the need for 
governmental indemnity, which is discussed below, Even more signifi­
cantly, for our purposes, the Brookhaven Report, or WASH-74 0, was 
subsequently to serve as a continuing source of alarm to nuclear power 
critics, 
The Price-Anderson Act 
The fourth major event with regard to atomic energy in 1957 was 
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the passage of the Price-Anderson Act of 1954, which dealt with the 
question of l:lability insurance for utilities who built nuclear power 
plants.18 The need for liability protection in case of accidents had 
already posed somthing of a problem for the first companies involved 
in atomic energy. While the AEC, as part of the federal government, 
was not liable to private suit, its contractors were not so protected. 
However, the early reactors had been relatively small, and had been 
built for the most part at remote locations. The companies involved 
had absorbed most of the risk as a cost of obtaining the contract 
relationship, and the AEC had also made limited provisions for govern­
mental indemnity. Now, with the new plans to license utilities to 
operate larger reactors in less isolated areas, 'Where they could 
contribute to high load requirements, greater amounts of insurani:e 
became a necessity. But simply obtaining liability insurance on the 
normal private market had two drawbacks. First, there was not s1.if­
ficient operating experience with nuclear reactors for the insurance 
underwriters to employ their standard actuarial techniques to deter­
mine operating risks and consequent premiums. Second, the extent of 
the coverage required, particularly in light of the kind of figu:res 
outlined in the Brookhaven Report, seemed beyond the resources o:f the 
private insurance industry, let alone those of any existing company. 
The problem was mentioned only briefly in the original debate on the 
1954 Act, and one critic has claimed that this was the result of a 
tacit agreement by the AEC and JCAE not to raise a potentially alarming 
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issue that might jeopardize public acceptance of atomic energy develop­
ment .19 But, by 1957, the apparent lack of sufficient liability 
insurance was being cited as a major drawback to further commitment 
by the utilities to nuclear power plants. On the other hand, like 
the utilities themselves, the insurance industry was not anxious to 
have the AEC move directly into its traditional area of activity. 
And Congress in particular was also concerned about the ability of 
members of the public who might be injured in a nuclear accident, to 
obtain financial redress. 
The legislative answer to this range of concerns was a composite 
system. The first tier of liability would be covered by private 
insurance, which power plant owners would be required to purchase in 
order.to obtain a license from the AEC. In order to provide this 
level of. coverage, originally set at $60 million in 1957, the insur­
ance industry formed a pool arrangement. Technically, there are two 
pools, one for stock companies, and one for mutual companies; but in 
practice they have operated in concert. It should also be noted that 
this insurance covers third-party liability only. Property insurance 
for the reactor owner is provided by a corresponding pool arrangement 
and by utility self-insurance. 
A second tier of liability insurance over and above that available 
from. pr1vate insurance and required of AEC licensees, would be provided 
by the federal government and administered by the AEC. This tier of 
protection would provide $500 million per plant per incident over and 
- 20 -
above the $60 million paid by insurance. In return for this govern­
mental indemnification, power plant licensees would be required to 
pay annual indemnification fees to the AEC; the size of such fees 
would be administratively determined, since there was no available 
method for scaling them to the size of the risk involved. For most 
caaes, it constitutes $30 per year for each 1,000 KW(t) of capacity. 
Finally, the Price-Anderson Act established an absolute limit on 
the level of liability to which any plant owner would be subject. 
That was set initially at $560 million, or the sum of the protection 
available fron1 both private insurance and government indemnity. The 
provisions of the Act were originally limited to licenses in the 
first ten years after its passage; but they would apply for the dura­
tion of such licenses, typically about 40 years. 
Again, a.1i: with the other modes of operation established with 
regard to atotilic energy, Price-Anderson would become a continuing 
focus of criticism; in this instance, on dual grounds. First, it 
would be argued that it constituted a further and unjustified subsidy 
to the industry. Second, it would be maintained that its necessity 
constituted evidence of inadequate safety in the operation of nuclear 
reactors. 
Licenses2 1957-62 
Despite the AEC's attempts to subsidize the development of power 
generation facilities based on nuclear reactots. there was still only 
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a limited number of applicants, And since each plant was essentially 
custom-built, each licensing procedure was similarly individualized, 
It was only in 1959 that the first complete regulatory record was 
established, with the granting of an operating permit to Commonwealth 
Edison' s  Dresden 1 unit near Chicago, Ironically, it was one of two 
installations which had been financed entirely by the utility, with 
no direct AEC subsidies. Built by General Electric, which had also 
been a major contractor for the AEC, it was of the boiling-water type. 
A year later, in 1960, the first provisional operating license for 
a Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor was granted for the Yankee 
Rowe facility in Massachusetts, to a utilities group called Yankee 
Atomic Electric Company. In contrast to the Dresden plant, Yankee 
Rowe ' s  builders had enjoyed some direct subsidies as part of the AEC's 
Power Reactor Demonstration Program.20 Then, in 1961, the first
recorded withdrawal of a license application took place, by the Florida 
West Coast Nuclear Group, Inc. However, b�cause the subsequent 
polemic literature on questions of nuclear safety has failed to 
mention this particular plant, it is assumed for the time being that 
the reason was probably not directly related to the licensing process. 
It was, incidentally, at this time that the Supreme Court upheld the 
earlier decision of the AEC to grant the Fermi reactor ' s  construction 
perm.it (see above) . 
In 1962, the pace of the licensing process picked up slightly, 
as three new plants were granted operating licenses.  They were a 
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pressurized-water reactor built for Consolidated Edison at Indiar;. 
Point, New York; a boiling-water reactor built for Consumers Pow€:r 
at Big Rock Point, �!ichigan; and a second boiling-water reactor, built 
for Pacific Gas and Electric at Humboldt Bay, California. 21 In addition,
several more plants were planned or under construction. But the 
process of building a nuclear power plant remained essentially a 
customized one" and there were only a handful of plants in actual 
operation. 
The 1962 Report to the President 
It was in this context, in March 1962, that President Kennedy 
asked the AEC, in cooperat ion with other energy-related agencies, to 
prepare a report on the status of the civilian nuclear power program. 
The report, whi.ch the Commission submitted to the President in November, 
1962, reaffirmed the desirability of the government's continuing its 
development program with regard to atomic energy, in order to provide 
a long term source of energy for the country's economic growth. It 
did stress the desire of the Commission to increase the role of private 
industry, parti.cula.rly with regard to reactor types which were now at 
the stage of commercial development, But it also maintained the 
Commission ' s  commitment to a continuing research and development pro­
gram of its own on more advanced reactor models. In particular, it 
emphasized the need for a special effort to develop breeder reactors 
for the long-term, as well as for a continuation of its current program, 
with its focus on expanded utilization, in the short term, of less 
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fuel-efficient models. 
PartiCularly interesting was the added emphasis placed in the 
report on the economic, as opposed to the technological, aspects of 
the program, The need for the technology of atomic energy to become 
competitive with other fuels for central station power plants was 
recognized. Yet the commitment to the development of such technology 
explicitly preceded any assurance of its ability to do so. Thus, 
the report explained the need for governmental involvement: 
"Since the product does not meet some hitherto unfilled need 
but rather must depend for its marketability upon purely 
economic advantages which, for some time, will be small 
compared to the investment, industry could not have afforded 
to undertake the development by itself, 1122 
Such a policy of course raised the question of whether atomic energy 
was displacing other power generation fuels purely as a result of its 
government subsidies. But the Commission's report demurred: 
"Concern has been expressed lest conversion to nuclear power 
might cause severe dislocation in the coal industry and hence 
on transportation, especially the railroads. This is 
definitely not the case."23 
Essentially, it was the Commission's contention that a rapidly 
growing market for electricity would be able to utilize growing 
inputs of both fossil fuels and nuclear power. 
On the other hand, concern � expressed for the current position 
of nuclear vendors, who supplied and built reactor systems for the 
utilities. AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg expressly raised the point in 
his letter of transmittal, which accompanied the 1962 report: 
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"It should be recognized that, largely as a result of early 
optimism, we have, in a short space of time, developed a 
competitive nuclear equipment industry which is over­
capitalized and under-used at the present time, This 
optimism has had some good results in terms of bringing 
many able technical men, manufacturers, and utility 
executives into the field, and assuring Congressional 
and industrial support during the development years. 
The optimism has also brought about some difficulties in 
that unless there are new starts in atomic power plants, the 
atomic equipment industry will probably dwindle down to 
fewer manufacturers than would be desirable for a healthy 
and competitive nuclear industry.1124 
Finally, the Commission's report addressed the question of the 
impact of its own regulatory requirements, then almost exclusively 
designed to insure public safety, on the willingness of the industry 
to commit itself to additional nuclear units: 
"Steps are being undertaken to simplify and streamline the 
licensing and regulatory procedures. A major step is the 
recent enactment of legislation that will reduce greatly 
the number of mandatory public hearings. The Commission 
is studying means to simplify its own licensing procedures 
by reducing the volume and complexity of administrative 
processes. 
The Commission is also studying ways to modify current 
regulations so that better guidance can be given to utilities 
on the suitability of specific reactor sites prior to their 
making substantial monetary outlays,"25 
Apparently, the requirements of government regulation, despite the 
corresponding advantage of government subsidies, were beginning to 
become a deterrent to industrial participation. 
Procedural Chan� 
As noted in the Commission report, the number of mandatory public 
hearings required by the 1957 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in 
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the aftermath of the Fermi ACRS report incident was reduced in 1962. 
Now, such hearings would only be mandatory at the construction permit 
stage of the licensing procedure; they would be held at the final, 
operating license stage only if there were appropriate intervenors, 
who would raise questions thought relevant and s:lgnificant by the 
Commission. Moreover, in 1963, the Commission set up a new system 
of Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, to ·replace its use of single 
hearing examiners in public hearings. Whereas the hearing examiners 
had been specialists in administrative law, the new Boards would also 
include scientific experts. An Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel of some twenty members, including both lawyers and atomic 
scientists was established. A three-person Atom:tc Safety and 
Licensing Board would be appointed from the Panel for each licensing 
case, either by the Commission or by the Panel Chairman (and Vice 
Chairman in his absence). The individual board would comprise one 
lawyer, who would preside at the hearing, and two scientists whose 
expertise was considered particularly relevant to the specific case. 
The aim of the new system Was apparently to shift the focus of 
licensing hearings from legal procedures toward substantive questions 
of technology, and to reduce the need for lengthy background explana­
tions by expert technical witnesses. 26 
Licenses, 1962-67 
Despite the Commission's concern for the welfare of the nuclear 
industry, there was a definite lag in the licensing program. No new 
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operating permits were granted in the period 1963 to 1965, and the 
experimental reactor at Hallam, Nebraska, which had gone critical in 
1962, was shut down in 1964, Moreover, there were two controversial 
applications to build nuclear power plants which were eventually with­
drawn.27 
In 1961, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, which was to obtain a 
provisional operating license for its first nuclear plant, at 
Humboldt Bay, California, in 1962, proposed to build a second plant 
at Bodega Head, about 50 miles north of San Francisco. When the 
utility's plans were made public in conjunction with its license 
application, local protesters objected to what they maintained would 
be the destruction of a scenic and previously undeveloped coastal 
site. Then it was discovered that the proposed site was in an area 
of extensive earthquake faulting. Questions were raised about the 
ability of rea.ctor structures to withstand earthquakes, and about 
the safety of locating a nuclear power plant in such an area in the 
light of technological uncertainty and proximity to a major population 
center. After considerable controversy, the utility withdrew its 
application at the end of 1964. 
In the meantime, the acceptability of locating nuclear reactors 
near major population centers had been questioned even more directly 
in .the East. Consolidated Edison CoIT::iany of New York had already 
obtained an operating license for its Indian Point plant in March, 
1962. Later that year, it sought to build a second plant at Rav.�nswood, 
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in the heart of New York City, in the Borough of Queens. The utility 
had sought to address the question of whether distance from population 
centers was· a necessary safety factor directly. But the public outcry 
over its proposal was so heated that Consolidated Edison withdrew its 
application early in 1964. For the first time s:tnce the Fermi contra-
versy in 1956, the siting of nuclear power plants had become a subject 
of public controversy. 
The Rise in Nuclear Plant Orders 
In retrospect, the five-year period 1962-1967 was a time of major 
transition in the atomic energy industry, rather than one of decline. 
Despite the lag in the number of operating permits granted and new 
signs of public concern, the number of nuclear reactor orders 
suddenly began to surge in 1965. Apparently, there were several 
related developments. First, in 1964, the Atomic Energy Act was 
amended to permit private ownership of nuclear materials themselves. 
Previously, utilities had only been able to lease their fuel from 
the AEC, and there had apparently been concern over the possible im-
pact of policy changes made after the investment in plants dependent 
upon nuclear fuel had taken place. 
Second, the liability proteCtion provided by the Price-Anderson 
Act was extended for an additional ten years, to licenses granted by 
1977. The system remained essentially unchanged, except to reflect 
the somewhat larger amount of private insurance then available. Thus, 
although the limitation on total liability remained at $560 million, 
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the amount of private insurance required of licensees was increa.sed 
from $60 million to $74 million; and the amount of governmental 
indemnity was correspondingly reduced. At the time of the bill'::: 
passage, the Joint Connnittee on Atomic Energy noted the improved 
position of the nuclear industry: 
"The Price-Anderson Act has clearly accomplished the second 
purpose for which it was enacted - removal of the deterrent to 
private industrial participation in the atomic energy program. 
This is obvious from the growth of the nuclear power industTy 
and the huge increase in the scope and complexity of corrnner,:ial 
nuclear energy activities."28 
But it felt the Act should be extended 11to ensure that this indu.s-
trial activity would continue and expand." Moreover, the Conmtittee 
argued: 
"Another relevant corrsideration is the dynamic nature of our 
national reactor develop�ent program. Although some power 
reactor types - the low conversion ratio light water reactors 
are now being offered by manufacturers on a competitive basis 
with fossil-fuel plants, the long-range requirements of this 
program call for continued cooperation between government and 
industry in the development of the more advanced converter and 
breeder type reactors which hold the promise of a more effective 
utilization of nuclear fuel resources. The development of 
some of these more advanced reactors is at roughly the same 
stage today as was the case with low conversion ratio light 
water reactors in 1957, and this development should similarly 
be encouraged through extension of the Price-Anderson legislation."29 
Third, there was a significant increase in the size of the nuclear 
reactors being built at this stage, which had a very favorable impact 
on their competitiveness with fossil-fuel plants. In 1967, Southern 
California Edison's plant at Sun Onofre, and Connecticut Yankee Atomic 
Power Company's unit at Haddam Neck received their operating licenses. 
Both were considerably larger than earlier demonstration plants; and 
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subsequent utility orders, beginning with Jersey Central Power and 
Light Company's Oyster Creek plant, and Niagara Mohawk Corporation's 
unit at .Nine Mile Point, New York, would be explicitly considered 
"large scale." 
Finally, in recognition of the greatly increased size of the 
reactors now being planned and ordered, the Commission initiated 
an update of the Brookhaven Report, on the extent of possible 
casualties and damages in the event of a "maximum credible accident.11 
A working committee met and began making preliminary estimates, 
which looked as if they would be much larger than those presented in 
the 1957 WASH-740 report. But the study was discontinued before it 
was completed. It was only in 1973 that the incomplete working papers 
were placed in the AEC's Washington Public Document Room, along with 
a new Commission report on light-water reactor safety. As a result, 
in 1965 there was no public outcry comparable to that engendered by 
the original Brookhaven Report. 
The 1967 Supplement to the Report to the President 
Early in 1967, the AEC published a supplement to its 1962 report 
to the President at the request of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy. In contrast to the guarded optimism of the original report, 
its supplement now noted that: 
"In the four years since the 1962 Report was issued, remarkable 
advanees have taken place in the promise of nuclear power and 
in its acceptance by the U.S. utility industry as a new source 
of electrical energy. Continued operating e4'"Perience with 
initial demonstration and experimental nuclear power plants 
and commitments to larger size demonstration plants have provided 
the necessary impetus for commitments by industry to large scale 
utility units."30 
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As a result, the projected development program concentrated much 
more explicitly on advanced reactors. particularly on various fo:rms 
of breeder reactors. On the other hand, some of the earlier exp1�ri-
ments were discontinued. The report supplement explained: 
"Evaluations since the 1962 Report have shown that some of 
the concepts described in the Report were only marginally 
superior to others whose success was nearer at hand and 
their development has been terminated. Other concepts have 
been discontinued because of especially difficult research 
or developmental engineering problems and the accompanying 
increased costs, delays, and difficulties associated with 
introducing the concept into the utility environment. "31 
Although the first high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) at 
PeaCh Bottom, Pennsylvania, received its operating license in 1966, 
several license applications for other reactor types were withdrawn 
in 1968, while others were considerably delayed. The light-wate1� 
reactors, including both boiling-water and pressurized-water rew::tor 
types, were to be the backbone of the Commission's comm.ereial potorer 
generation program, at least for the near-term. 
Nonetheless, the Commission still remained cautious about 
claiming that nuclear power had achieved a state of full-scale com-
mercialization. In both 1965 and 1966, the AEC declined to make a 
statutory finding of "practical value" under the provisions of the 
Atomic Energy Act. Such a finding would represent a formal ackneiwl-
edgement of the technology's progression beyond the experimental and 
development stage. But the Commission found that, "although ligb.t-
water reactor systems show eeonomic promise as·evidenced by utility 
orders, the degree of actual experience needed to confirm the status 
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of these eoncepts has not been obtained • • • .  u32 On the other hand, 
the Commission ' s  licensing procedures began to become more standard-
ized, as greater experience was obtained , and the number of plants 
being built increased. In 1966, the AEC staff published its first 
nGuide to the Organization and Contents of Safety Analysis Reports." 
Progress was made in developing general design criteria for construe-
tion permits and an improved technical specifications system. It was 
noted too� in the 1967 Supplement to the report on Civilian Nuclear 
Power, that: 
"An increasing number of prospective applicants are meeting 
with the AEC staff in advance of filing applications to 
obtain informal views on siting questions , safety features 
of projected reactors, and information on licensing proce­
dures . The regulatory staff also has offered the opportunity 
�o manufacturers to conduct pre-licensing reviews of the 
reactor systems and components to reduce subsequent 
licensing time. n33 
License s ,  1969-74 
From 1969 on, there would be a continuing and increasing stream 
of operating licenses issued for additional nuclear units : four in 
1969; four in 1970; five in 1971; six in 1972; and twelve in 1973. 
Orders, too, would continue to rise, until as of June 30 ,  1974,
there would be a total of 212 reactor units operating, under construe-
tion, or on order.34 Even larger increases would be projected to 
the turn of the century by the AEC. Nuclear energy had apparently 
passed the test of industrial acceptance . Future difficulties would 
emerge, in large part, from a different source. 
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III. THE INTERVENORS 
With a few exceptions, the policy debates about the devel6pment 
of atomic energy remained a relatively limited affair until the late 
1960's. Most of the participants were specialists, who were profes-
sionally involved - whether as scientists ,  lawyers, businessmen,, or 
politicians. But then, citizen concern began to spread, probab:Ly at 
least in part in tandem with the increasing number and size of the 
proposed nuclear units themselves. Beginning in 1969 , a number of 
books were published for general audiences , criticizing the way in 
which the technology of nuclear energy had been developed, and 
questioning the adequacy of provisions to protect the public health 
and safety. 35 Simultaneously, there seemed to be an increase in the 
number of scientists who were willing to become directly and person-
ally involved in policy, as contrasted with narrowly scientific, 
debates. Public hearings in licensing cases were no longer atte,nded 
only by the AEC ' s  Regulatory Staff and industry representative s .  
There was a substantial increase in the number o f  formal interventions, 
and attempted interventions i in AEC proceedings. Whereas such cases 
had been isolated incidents before� the atypical licensing case tended 
to become one in which there were no potential intervenors. While , 
as noted earlier, the number· of operating licenses granted for nuclear 
power plants by the AEC rose steadily from 1969, there was also a 
continuing rise in the number of applications withdraw n ,  albeit on a 
smaller scale.36 Moreover, there were a number of court cases which 
dealt with issues concerning the AEC's exercise of its regulatory role. 
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The major change was an increase in the scope of the policy debate. Now 
there were more participants, more issues, and more arenas for debate. 
But the overall focus of the debate also shifted, from concentration 
on the need to develop an economically competitive atomic energy 
technology for power generation, to primary concern with issues of 
safety and of environmental acceptability. 
Radiation Protection 
The obvious and central hazard of using atomic energy is of 
course radiation; and so the first major issue to be raised was 
the adequacy of available protection from radiation e-xposure. The 
Commission had been aware of the need for strict control of exposure 
to radioactive materials from its inception; and both Atomic Energy 
Acts specifically mandated the AEC to be responsible for protection 
of the public health and safety with regard to radiation. Moreover, 
beginning in the 195 0 1 s ,  there had been considerable public concern 
over the radiation hazards to which the general population was 
exposed as a result of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Such 
concerns had eventually led to the nuclear test ban treaty. But now 
questions were raised as to the radiation exposure engendered by 
nuclear power generation plants and their support activities and 
facilities - for atomic industrial workers, for those in the immediate 
vicinity of various atomic energy installations, and for the public 
generally. Although the specific issue stressed varied somewhat over 
the 19 69 to 1974 period, questions and objections would be raised 
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about the permitted level of routine radioactive effluents or 
releases, both from nuclear power plants themselves, and from the 
entire nuclear fuel cycle; and about the possibility and likelihood 
of unusual releases of radioactivity as the result of either accidents 
or acts of sabotage , Moreover, not only were there questions about 
the effectiveness of the Atomic Energy Commission in assuring that 
its contractors and licensees adhered to established radiation regu­
lations; questions were also asked directly about the adequacy of 
the regulations themselves in protecting the health of atomic workers 
and the public. 
Environmental Protection 
�n addition to the various forms of the radiation argument, a 
second set of more broadly environmental issues was also raised. 
Here the attitude of the Atomic Energy Commission was markedly dif­
ferent , The Commission had always recognized its responsibility for 
radiation hazards; indeed� the need for an unusual degree of regula­
tion of the atomic energy industry was in large part justified as a 
consequence of its peculiar radiation dangers. But the AEC had 
never included in its mandate the responsiblity for other possible 
impacts from its development of atomic energy facilities. In fact, 
its proponents had argued that nuclear power plants were essentially 
nonpolluting, as compared to fossil-fuel plants , ·  Thus, when it was 
suggested that the heat discharge from nuclear· installations t o  
adjacent bodies o f  water was creating problems o f  thermal pollution,37 
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the first reaction cf the AEC was to disclaim responsibility. Such 
problems, if any, the Commission argued, were the concern of other 
governmental agencies, with other legislative mandates. In fact, the 
AEC Chairman, Glenn Seaborg, went so far as to argue that, "with 
respect to resolution of the thermal effects of cooling water dis-
charges, we do not at present have legal authority in this area."38 
New Hampshire v. AEC. When the State of New Hampshire questioned 
this interpretation, as implemented in an AEC licensing decision, in 
the Federal Courts, the AEC's position was upheld. In 1969, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the Commission's 
jurisdiction extended to radiological safety alone, ho"W"ever unfortu-
nate the results of such a finding might be. 39
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC. When the National 
Envirorunental Policy Act of 1969 was sub_sequently enacted, it required 
all federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements for 
any actions or projects which would have a substantial impact on the 
environment. But, in keeping with its earlier interpretations of its 
mandate, and with the court ruling in the New Hampshire case, the AEC 
maintained that its responsibilitY and jurisdiction extended only to
the radiological aspects of environmental issues.. Hence, its proposed 
regulations for the implementation of NEPA ' s  requirements were con-
cerned only "With the impact of radioactive emissions from nuclear 
power plants and other installations. 
The Commission ' s  interpretation was once again questioned in the 
courts, "With regard to a proposed power plant in Maryland. However, 
- 36 -
with the broadened language of NEPA in force, this time the ruling 
was different. In 1971, in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Conrrnittee v. 
AEC, the U.S. Court cf Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 
that, "The Commission's crabbed interpretation of NEPA makes .a 
mockery of the Act." Moreover, the court went on to outline exten-
sive remedial steps: 
"This decision required that (1) NEPA be implemented for all 
licensing proceedings- begun after January 1, 1970, and that 
this implementation include independent AEC assessment of 
water quality and other environmental factors at every 
important decision making stage, including a case-by-cas'e 
cost-benefit assessment balancing environmental and non­
environmental factors; (2) the licensing boards of the 
AEC (ASLB 's) must give independent review to all NEPA 
matters in uncontested as well as contested cases; (3) the 
AEC must give prompt NEPA consideration to facilities for 
which permits and licenses were issued after January 1, 1970, 
if such matters were not substantially considered in the 
or_iginal licensing action; and (4) with respect to con­
struction permits issued before January 1, 1970, the AEC must 
consider any significant non-radiological environmental 
impact and order such facility operations as may be need,ed. 1140 
Minnesota v. Northern States Po'W'er Company. A third court case 
addressed the adequacy of the AEC 1 s  regulations with regard to radio­
active standards, its primary area of concern, although it did so 
once again on jurisdictional grounds. The State of Minnesota had 
established radiation emissions standards which were dramatica.lly 
more stringent than those of the AEC, although they were allegedly 
designed to be within the reach of existing technology for typical 
nuclear reactors. The State first sought to enforce its standards 
in 1968 in considering a waste-disposal permit . for the Northern States 
Power Company , which had received a construction permit from the AEC 
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to build its Monticello plant. The company brought suit in the 
federal courts on the grounds that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 , 
as amended, constituted federal pre-emption with regard to radia­
tion standards and emissions controls , so that the State lacked 
authority to act in that field. The U . S .  District Court ruled in 
favor o f  the company in 1971, and the decision was subsequently 
upheld by the Supreme Court. As a consequence the states can only 
regulate radioact ive emissions from nuclear power plants indirectly, 
by setting water quality standard s . 41 Although with different im­
plications for the substance of regulation than the Calvert Cliffs 
case, Minnesota v .  Northern States Power Company had the same pro­
cedural effect: the central arena for debating the impact of 
nuclear power development would remain the AEC. Other institutional 
influences would have to be mediated by their effects on the Com­
mission itself. 
Organizational Changes 
Nor was the agency to prove impervious to forces for change, 
despite assertions to the contrary by opponents of nuclear power. 
The period since .the emergence of the intervenors as a continuing 
factor has been one of repeated organizational change. In December 
19 7 0 ,  Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to require that the AEC 
include in its licensing process an antitrust review of applicants 
in cooperation with the Department of Justice.· The Calvert Cliffs 
case o f  course imposed extensive new requirements on the Commission, 
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'as noted above. An_d more recently, there have been attempts , some 
successful and others not, to use the courts to force the Conrrnis­
sion to take specific policy actions in areas of current deba.te. 
The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 also brought another 
governmental agency directly into the field of atomic energy, 
since the EPA was given responsibility for setting radiation 
standards for health protection purposes. Previously, the Atomic 
Energy Commission had based its regulations on standards set by 
a private scientific organization, the National Council on Radia­
tion Protection (NCRP) , and reviewed by a Cabinet-level Federal 
Radiation Council. Although the Commission retains the responsi­
bility for determining permissible levels of raCioactive effluents 
from nuclear installations , it must now take into account the 
independent determination,. with technologica� staff support , o f  
permissible exposure standards b y  another agency, from the perspec­
tive of another legislative mandate. And the EPA ' s  Office of 
Radiation Protection has taken active steps to develop its own 
stance on the question of radiation standards. It has , for example, 
issued a report on the concept of an environmental dose commitment 
for radiation exposure , which permits consideration of long-term 
effects from repeated low-level exposures . 4 2 Use of such a .concep� 
in establishing legal standards ,  in place of annual exposure limits 
set by the AEC could conceivably have a substantial effect on the 
permitted expansion of nuclear power generation facilities. 
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Similarly, the EPA has also prepared an extenSive critique of the 
AEC r s  draft environmental impact statement for its LMFBR program, 43 
Public access. However, the Commission has also made extensive 
attempts on its own initiative to respond to the concerns of its 
critics. In part, at least, such efforts correspond to a change in 
personnel, with the appointment first of James Schlesinger, in 1971, 
and then of Dixy Lee Ray, in 1973 , as chairmen of the Com.mission. 
Neither had previous connections with the atomic energy field, and 
both were explicitly committed to opening up the Commission ' s  
decisionmaking t o  greater public scrutiny, and even debate. Indica­
tive of this att itude is the fact that the AEC did not appeal the 
Calvert Cliffs decision, despite its stringent requirements. And 
the cOmmission has in fact devoted extensive manpower to fulfilling 
its newly defined obligations . In 1972, the Commission ' s  Rules of 
Practice were revised to facilitate public participation in licensing 
proceedings. It has also made available much more extensive infor­
mation about the development and operation of atomic installat ions . 
In part, this has involved making a greater proportion of the docu­
mentary materials submitted in support of licensing applications 
available in the public documents room. In part, it has involved a 
vastly increased publications effort on the part of the Commission. 
For example, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory ' s  bimonthly j ournal 
on Nuclear Safety, now includes summary reports on all unusual oc­
�urrences at nuclear installations. The Commission ·has also publishe d ,  
a t  the request of the JCAE, an extensive report o n  The Safety of 
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Nuclear Power Reactors (Light Wate:r Cooled) and Related Facilities, 44
which draws together a considerable technical literature. And it 
has now published an extensive series of regulatory guides which 
lay out in considerable detail the kinds of standards which it 
requires of license applicants. The end result is a vast array of 
published material for those who have the resources to utilize it . 
In 1973, meetings of the ACRS were also opened to the public for 
the first time. 45 Thus, the Commission seems to have quite thorough­
ly reversed its earlier practice of extensive secrecy in its dec.ision­
making . In addition, the AEC has made several even more substantial 
changes in its own procedures and organization, largely in response 
to the criticisms of the intervenors . 
Rulemaking hearings . The first of these is the Commission 1 s 
institution of so-called rulemaking hearings for subjects of geni?.ric 
concern with regard to light-water reactors. A major complaint of 
the intervenors had been that the same issues had to be raised 
repeatedly in each licensing case in order to have an overall impact 
on the course of atomic energy development , since the Ccmmission 
operated exclusively on a case-by-case basis. This condition po:sed 
a severe strain on the resources of what were essentially voluntary 
organizations . In response to such criticism, the AEC held its 
first rulemaking hearings , on the permissible levels of radioactiv-2 
releases from nuclear installations, in 1971. These eventually 
resulted in adoption by the Commission of regulations which requ:lred 
nuclear plants to keep their radioactive releases "as low as 
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practicable," rather than simply within a preestablished limit . It 
subsequently held extensive and controversial rulemaking hearings on 
the criteria required of license applicants '  Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems, for controlling the potential for radioactive releases in 
the event of a loss-o f-coolant accident (LOCA) . The Comllliss ion has 
also used the device of rulemaking hearings for questions relating 
to the nuclear fuel cycle , and to quality control requirements for 
nuclear licenses. 
Separation of regulation and development. A second major 
change has been implemented in the Commission ' s  organization of its 
own supporting staff. A repeated complaint of nuclear critics had 
been that the inclusion of the Commiss ion ' s  safety research program 
within its division for reactor technology development , as well as 
the linkage of regulatory and developmental functions within the 
same agency, inevitably subordinated the requirements of safety to 
the desire for greater diffusion of nuclear technology. In fact, 
this quest ion had been given serious thought long before the inter­
venors became regular participants in the licensing process . For 
exampl e ,  in 19 61 ,  a book published as the product of the University 
of Michigan Law School ' s  Atomic Energy Project discussed the question 
extensively, and recommended that the advantages to be gained in 
knowledgeable regulatory personnel from the combination of the tw� 
functions outweighed any disadvantages with regard to conflicting 
policy goals . 4 6 In the face of increasing criticism on this score 
in the early 197 0 ' s ,  however, the Commission separated its safety 
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research program from its general program of reactor technology 
development , and even supported an Administration proposal to create 
two completely new agencies to be responsible for developmental and 
regulatory activities, respectively. In anticipation of that division, 
in 1972, the Commission began to publish its annual report to the 
Congress in two separate volume s ,  one on "Operating and Developmental 
Functions11 and the other on "Regulatory Activities. ,,47 
Price-Anderson revision. A third area in w�ich the Commission 
was responsive to external criticism was that of governmental indetllllity 
for the owners of nuclear power plants. The extended Price-Anderson 
Act was not due to expire until 1977. But it was argued that be cause 
of the long lead time required to bring a nuclear plant on line, 
utilities were already being adversely affected in their decis ion­
making by the fact that the Act might not be renewed in the face. of
continued criticism. AEC Chairman Schlesinger, who was leaving the 
Commission for another post. specifically indicated that he felt the 
Act ' s  special provisions were no longer necessary; and subsequently, 
Chairman Ray r.eporte.dly concurred in that j udgment . 48 Although 
Congress declined to eliminate the provisions of the Price-Ande1:·son 
Act altogether, its provisions were modified, with the concurren.ce 
of the Commission, to phase out its governmental indemnity aspects 
over time, in favor of a system of contingency fees and increasE:d 
private insurance. The amount of coverage to be provided per 
incident per plant was also substantially increased . 
The Rasmussen report . Finally. a recurring complaint of 
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nuclear power critics had been that the AEC failed to update publicly 
its controversial Brookhaven Report of 1957, to allow for the greatly 
increased number and size of currently scheduled nuclear plants, In 
June 1973, the Commission released the working papers and internal 
memoranda for the uncompleted 1965 updat8 of WASH-740, in conjunction 
with its new reactor safety report (see above) . Then, in August 1974, 
it published a completely new evaluation, An Assessment of Accident 
Risks in U.S .  Commercial Nuclear Power Plants ,  in conjunction with 
its ten appendices, represented the outcome of a two-year study 
under the direction of MIT Professor of Nuclear Engineering, Norman 
Rasmussen. Using event and fault tree methodologies ,  the study 
sought to establish a probabilistic risk assessment of the operation 
of 100 nuclear power plants currently licensed or under construction. 
In contrast with the findings of the 1957 WASH-740 Report , the 
Rasmussen Study (WASH-1400) finds that the overall risk of a nuclear 
accident - including the consequences as well as probability of 
occurrence - is very low. While the Rasmussen study ' s  assumptions 
and methodologies are still open to criticism, as is the Commission 's 
assessment of its significance, its completion and publication 
represent a serious effort on the part of the AEC to respond in a 
substantive way to the assertions of its critics. 
Streamlining the regulatory process. While much of the AEC ' s  
attention has been focused on the intervenors in recent years , 
particularly with regard to the licensing of plants utilizing 
existing light-water reactor technology, the Commission has also 
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maintained its concern for the well-being of the nuclear industry. 
This fact was. reflected in the early request for consideration c1f 
extension of the Price-AnderSon Act cited above . And it is demon­
strated even more directly in the recent attempts by the Commission 
to streamline its regulatory process in response to complaints by 
the industry that the intervenors were causing costly and unnece�s­
sary delays in bringing nuclear plants on line. 49 Such complaints 
were given extra force by the eruption of the so-called "energy 
crisis" in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, and by the Nixon 
Administration ' s  cotnmitment to Project Independence. The feasi-· 
bility of such a policy of energy self-sufficiency would depend 
heaVily on an increasing use of nuclear power for the generation 
of electricity. In addition, AEC Chairman Dixy Lee Ray was askc�d 
by President Nixon to prepare a report on The Nation's Energy Future,50 
so that the Commission was directly aware of the issue'·s salience. 
As a consequence , the Commission is currently committed to a major 
effort to reduce the lead time for bringing nuclear power plants 
on line. Besides attempting to speed up its current case-by-ca��e 
review procedures, it has implemented licensing changes which 
greatly encourage standardization of plant design. These include 
three options. Under the Reference System approach, the technical 
review of the design for either an entire facility or a substanti;:.l 
part of it can then be referenced for additional plants using the 
same design, without further detailed regulatory review. Applications 
have been submitted for standardized nuclear steam supply systens 
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under this option, and standard plant design applications are under 
consideration by some utilities . The second option , known as the 
Duplicate Plant approach, allows a single technical review for 
several identical plants ,  which are to be constructed at different 
sites by a single utility or utility group within a limited time 
period. Again, an application has been submitted under this option, 
and others are being planned .  Finally, the License to Manufacture 
option provides a single licensing review for the manufacture of 
identical reactors at a central location, for subsequent transpor­
tation to different sites, This· last procedure was designed origi­
nally for offshore, barge-mounted plants . S I  I n  addition, the 
Commission has developed legislative proposals for even more 
extensive streamlining of its license review process .  
Continuity in the issues . The Commission has also continued 
its connnitment to a strong developmental program, with particular 
emphasis on breeder reactors. And it has placed heavy emphasis on 
the effort to involve private industry in the building of a 
breeder demonstration plant. It has made exploratory efforts to 
encourage private industry to take responsibility for developing 
further capacity for uranium enrichment services, a task previously 
undertaken solely by the AEC . Thus . there is considerable continuity 
in the �attern of policy issues engendered by the atomic energy 
indus try, even though the specific aspects of the technology most 
directly involved have changed over time . 
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At the same time, the efforts by the AEC to resp6nd to 
criticism by nuclear intervenors have not eliminated the latt·er ' s  
role in the decis ionmaking proces s .  A s  in the case of the nrn::lear 
industry, it is only the specific issues which have changed. Cur­
rent controversy focuses primarily on the failure of the AEC Ito 
develop a permanent system of disposal for high-level radioactive 
wastes before licensing the plants and installations which produce 
them; on the alleged inadequacy of AEC procedures to protect 'the 
public from radioact ive releases as the result of acts of nuclear 
sabotage; and on the advisability of pursuing further the Comrnis­
sion's program for development of the breeder reactor, and particu­
larly the sodium-cooled LMFBR, in the face of allegedly adverse 
cost and safety features. On the procedural side, the same situa­
tion prevails. Now that the contention of the nuclear critic�1 
that the AEC ' s  promotional and regulatory responsibilities shciuld 
be vested in separate agencies is about to be implemented by t:he 
legislation establishing the Energy Research and Development 
Administration, and the Nuclear Safety and Licensing Commission, 52 
the focus of concern has shifted. It is currently argued that there 
should be a mcratorium on further licensing of nuclear plants until 
the substantive points of controversy can be resolvea . 53 There is 
still n" general agreement: on what the goals of the atomic energy 
program should be , or how its decisionmaking procedures should be 
structured in order to achie"ve them. That basic lack of agreement 
is an overr:i.ding characteristic of the literature on atomic energy 
which has been reviewed , 
l.  
2 .  
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
s .  
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